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This chapter takes stock of the issues involved in sovereign risk management, focusing 
on developing countries.  It identifies the needs for risk management at the country level 
by briefly reviewing the various shocks developing countries are exposed to.  It then 
reviews the actual use of risk management tools by developing countries and tries to 
identify the reasons why risk management has been so limited in practice.  It identifies 
the degree of incompleteness of international financial markets, weak incentives in 
international markets, poor incentives at the country level and a limited role to date of 
international financial institutions and international agencies as important reasons behind 
the lack of risk management. The chapter sketches a way forward by analyzing possible 




2. OBSTACLES TO BETTER RISK MANAGEMENT IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
2.1. Multiple and large risks   
 
Developing countries often face large exposures to international risks, more so than the 
typical developed country.  Commodity prices and terms of trade more generally are the 
most obvious sources of risk where on average developing countries are more exposed 
than most developed countries are (although there are some exceptions, such as Norway, 
oil).  As recent events have shown again dramatically, climatic shocks and natural 
disasters, such as drought, earthquakes, hurricanes and others, tend to afflict many 
developing countries as well, more so than most developed countries.  Most developing 
countries, and especially small countries, have limited potential to act against these 
natural risks internally.  Some of these shocks are partly under the influence of 
governments as they can take preventive actions, such as building irrigation or dikes, 
using drought-resistant crops, and other actions, including encouraging diversification. 
But in many cases these solutions are too costly or inefficient or the shocks are outside 
the country’s influence. Other sources of risks are those arising from conflicts and wars, 
also more prevalent among developing countries, but these are perhaps more endogenous 
to economic performance. 
 
Since most developing countries are in need of additional funds for investment and thus 
seek external savings and access to global capital markets, various other risks are 
introduced.  Middle-income countries – i.e., mainly emerging markets – are often 
exposed to the vagaries of international capital flows and risks arising from them, e.g., 
financial contagion arising from crises elsewhere, sudden stops in capital flows, etc.  The 
limited ability of many governments to raise funds internationally in local currencies 
forces them to borrow in claims denominated in foreign exchange and exposes them to 
the risk of currency adjustment, i.e., devaluations, affecting in turn their overall debt 
burden in local currency terms.1  In addition to these shocks, sometimes endogenous to 
the countries’ own policies, there are purely or largely exogenous risks.  Relatively large 
external debts denominated in non-local currencies make for significant impact of major 
creditor countries’ interest rates changes.  And borrowing in a variety of currencies 
implies that cross-currency exchange rate changes (e.g., dollar, yen, and euro) can impact 
debt burdens.  The uncertainty of international capital flows extends itself to the 
provision of official development assistance, which has been found to be substantially 
more volatile than domestic fiscal revenues.  Furthermore, its volatility grows with aid 
                                                 
1 Of course, the risk of currency devaluations is not independent of the currency structure of debt, nor is the 




dependency (see further Bulíř and Hamann, 2003).  
 
Many of these risks are not fully exogenous, though. Domestic policies and the country’s 
institutional environment can affect, for example, the degree of international risk-taking 
by local financial institutions and corporations. The willingness of official lenders to 
provide assistance may also be a function of the country’s policies, thus hindering a 
smooth flow of assistance. There is also a range of contingent risks that can afflict the 
fiscal authorities of developing countries, such as those arising from banking and 
financial crises and vulnerabilities in the corporate sector.  More so than in developed 
countries, governments of developing countries have come to absorb these risks.  
Although again these risks are to a large extent endogenous to the institutional 
environment in these countries, to some extent the institutional environment itself is a 
function of the overall risk the country faces. 
 
2.2. Limited access to financial sector tools for risk management 
 
Risk-management tools have been available for several decades to deal with many of 
these risks in developed countries and creditworthy financial institutions and 
corporations.  The spectrum of risk management tools and their ease of use have further 
improved over the past two decades with the introduction of many new derivatives. This 
has not benefited most developing countries though, mainly as access is more limited and 
as the supply of risk management tools specifically useful for their situations has been 
less ample or more expensive to design on a customized basis. The smoothing of shocks 
through borrowing (and lending) is limited given the tighter external debt limits for these 
countries, due to their weaker economic and institutional situations.  Importantly, the lack 
of mechanisms to enforce internationally financial claims on governments and the 
absence of formal bankruptcy rules at the sovereign level, including the lack of a 
determination of seniority status, limits the ability and willingness of international 
financial markets to provide the right forms of external financing, including risk 
management tools.    
 
The access of governments to financing from the international private sector to smooth 
flows has been especially constrained at times of large adverse shocks (and possibly too 
generous at times of favorable shocks, undermining incentives at the country level).  The 
use of (contingent) credit lines from private sector commercial banks and other financial 
institutions to deal with shocks has proven to be difficult as amounts remain limited and 
availability not 100% assured when needed (due to contingencies within the credit line 
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agreements, such as force majeure, among other reasons).2   And these mechanisms come 
with financial costs (sometimes they require collateral and they always have commitment 
fees and spreads), which can make them not more attractive than self-insurance.  
Furthermore, using these tools can send adverse signals on the creditworthiness of the 
country. 
 
There are hedging instruments (such as short-dated futures and options, and collateralized 
swaps) that do not raise concerns on credit risks and are available in principle to countries 
of all credit-standings.  These instruments, however, have limited hedging potential as 
their maturities are short and require the ability to raise own cash-flow on short notice, 
i.e., are (even more) akin to forms of self-insurance.  Furthermore, they provide price 
insurance, not value insurance, whereas many of the shocks for developing countries, 
especially on the export side, relate to unexpected quantity changes uncorrelated with 
price changes.3  They are often also not based on price indexes close enough to the 
underlying exposures of developing countries to provide a good match.4  Furthermore, it 
may not always be appropriate for small developing countries to use financial risk-
mitigating instruments. Some commodity risk management markets have strong 
information asymmetries, as they are quite concentrated, like cocoa, where a few traders 
in the futures market possess more information than other agents and policy makers.  As 
a consequence, countries may not stand to get a fair value when participating.  
 
The longer-dated derivatives instruments, which can also be more tailored to the specific 
circumstances of countries, notably swaps and other OTC products, are less available due 
to creditworthiness constraints.  Longer-dated financing tools, such as GDP-indexed 
bonds and other real-indexed instruments specifically useful for developing countries, 
have limited availability, to date at least. Two examples, the Brady bonds of Bulgaria that 
included a GDP-indexed recapture clause and the conversion bonds issued by Argentina, 
show some of the difficulties with these instruments.  The Bulgarian bonds did not 
become effective as the bonds were bought back by the government before the clause 
could have become effective and there were also some design issues. For Argentina, 
where negotiations were very difficult, a separate GDP-indexed instrument was finally 
included in the debt conversion. 
 
Other tools to manage international risks exist.  These have several drawbacks, however, 
                                                 
2 The credit lines for Argentina, for example, stipulated that the banks could walk out of the contract if 
Argentina defaulted on its international bonds.  Furthermore, the commercial banks may count the credit 
against their other lending as part of their overall credit limits, thereby negating some of the benefits. 
3 Most of the small developing countries are price takers but face large output variations, especially in cash 
crops.  See Gilbert and Tabova (2004). 
4 There may be differences, for example, in the grade of commodity exported by the country and the 
international commodity trade on a futures exchange. Gilbert and Tabova (2004) estimate that international 
commodity price contingent contracts will consequently only provide very limited risk sharing. 
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mainly as they are mostly self-insurance schemes.  Take for example commodity 
stabilization funds, which have been tried by a variety of countries (see Newbery and 
Stiglitz, 1981 for the principles of and earlier experiences with commodity stabilization 
funds; see Claessens and Duncan, 1993, Priovolos and Duncan 1991, and Dehn, Gilbert 
and Varangis 2005, for more studies and a recent review). Given the process of many 
commodity prices, with relatively low rates of mean reversion, i.e., many price behave 
close to a random walk process, the funds have to be very large to be effective.  (In the 
extreme case of prices that are perfectly random walks, and without some adjustment 
costs, there is no use having a fund at all since price changes are permanent).  
 
Even with some degree of mean-reversion in prices, funds still involve self-insurance 
and, as they have to be large given the price processes, are thus quite costly for 
developing countries.  Funds are furthermore vulnerable to political pressures, especially 
when they get large.  Nevertheless, under some circumstances, as experiences from Chile, 
Norway and some other countries show, there can be a value from funds to smooth, if 
anything, the adjustment of the budgeting processes to international price and revenue 
changes.  Some developing countries, like Kazakhstan and Nigeria, have now established 
commodity stabilization funds. 
 
2.3. Constraints within developing countries   
 
As noted, many developing countries lack sufficiently high credit standing to access the 
longer-dated instruments. This lack of credibility is not just reflected in a limited ability 
for governments to borrow in foreign exchange, but is also apparent in their problems in 
issuing debt in local currency and at fixed interest rates.  Few developing countries have, 
for example, been able to establish deep, local bond markets, although more and more are 
now trying. Furthermore, risk management has had a low political payoff due to the many 
political constraints, e.g., short political horizons, and potential backlash, e.g., how will 
unnecessary hedging be perceived ex-post.  And the limited human and institutional 
capacity makes effective risk management, given its technical nature, an even more 
difficult proposition in most developing countries’ public sectors.  
 
These constraints are in part due to a number of factors that also complicate sovereign 
risk management.  In general, the dividing lines between public and private risks are 
fuzzier in developing than in developed countries. There is a larger involvement of the 
state in economic decision-making, including often through state-ownership, but also 
through other forms of intervention.  Some of this larger role is inherent to the process of 
development and justifiable.  Much of the large role of the state, however, reflects 
political economy factors where “rents” are allocated through public sector actions, 
including state ownership, poor regulation and weak or biased enforcement.  The 
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outcome gets reflected in part in the presence of much moral hazard, with “too large to 
fail” (or “too large to ignore”) banks, non-bank financial institutions and corporations 
(see Dooley, 2000, for such a moral hazard model and its effects of risk-taking and 
financial crises).   
 
This large involvement and extensive safety net makes sovereign risk management 
complicated as the objectives become less obvious: should one attempt to reduce risks to 
the government only, or to the whole country, as the government effectively ends up as 
the insurer of major parts of the economy?  Various answers may exist. The government 
may only apply risk management to its own balance sheet.  Or it may in some dimensions 
also hedge for the private sector (or “subsidize” its hedging), since that reduces the risks 
of spillover to the government.  Or it may attempt to hedge for the whole economy.  The 
optimal combination may depend, among other factors, on the incompleteness of 
domestic markets since that will determine how risks are being allocated within the 
economy.5 
 
Furthermore, there can be barriers to private risk management, including sometimes legal 
and regulatory restrictions on accessing foreign financial markets, which strengthen 
private-sector pressure on government to take a more supportive role.  Again, a tradeoff 
may arise in the context of other imperfections.  Some limits on private sector access to 
foreign financial markets can reduce risks in other ways (e.g., banks may be restricted in 
their net open foreign exchange positions to mitigate moral hazard concerns).  At the 
same time, reducing the ability of banks to offer a hedge may make the non-financial 
sector more vulnerable to external shocks.  Finally, human capacity constraints will be 
considerable impediments in developing countries.  Often, however, the incentive 
framework is the largest impediment to better private sector risk management, with a too 
large safety net (e.g., too big to fail) being one of the most important institutional reasons 
not to hedge. 
 
2.4. Constraints coming from international capital markets   
 
An important international financial markets’ “impediment” to having countries improve 
their risk management is that any gains from risk management accrue to all investors and 
lenders, not just the one providing the hedging tools or incorporating it in its lending 
operations.  There is thus a coordination problem impeding improved country risk 
management: as less risk at the borrower level benefits all lenders, no single lender will 
require it.  And even when risks are being addressed at the borrower or project level – 
                                                 
5 Solé (2004) simulates what the optimal policy might be in the presence of local hedging market 
imperfections and finds that, depending on the severity of the imperfections, the optimum can be self-
insurance through accumulation of large foreign exchange reserves by the public sector, the provision of a 
subsidized foreign exchange hedging market, or a laissez faire approach. 
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where often only a single or a few lenders are involved, and appropriate risk management 
techniques are put in place – country or sector-wide risks are not necessarily being 
considered by individual lenders.6   
 
This coordination problem has been aggravated over the past few decades by the 
increasing number of lenders to and investors in developing countries.  Whereas two 
decades ago, a limited number of international banks provided the bulk of financing – or 
at least were the lead syndicating banks – and largely to governments, now many 
investors provide financing to a wide variety of borrowers, making for a large number of 
lenders for any given country.  In addition, international financial market participants are 
subject to the moral hazard of trusting in existing schemes of implicit official support, 
especially in countries where official lenders and donors are large, which further reduces 
their incentives to require better risk management from the governments to which they 
lend. 
 
Another constraint coming from the international financial markets is that, while there 
have been many innovations in financial markets over the last few decades with many 
new risk management products being developed, this has not always been a direct 
response to the underlying hedging needs. Rather, the process of financial innovations 
has often been ad-hoc following major events or in response to government actions or 
regulations.  For example, indexing to real variables, while very useful in theory, has not 
been much developed.  Only a few developed countries, for example, have active markets 
in real (inflation-linked) government bonds, although the economic case has been made 
long ago and the techniques for pricing such bonds are well established.  Only active 
involvement of governments had led to the development of these markets in such 
industrial countries as the UK and US.  Indexed bonds exist in some developing 
countries, e.g., Chile, but more as responses to poor prior macroeconomic policy 
management, than as an attempt to complete markets.  
 
Similar to the general coordination issues in financial markets, it is hard for any particular 
creditor or government to introduce many other potential financial innovations (e.g., 
recall the case of collective action clauses).  These coordination issues often hinder the 
development of instruments specifically useful for developing countries.  In addition, 
issues such as moral hazard and poorer quality of data for developing countries (in case 
of GDP-indexed bonds where governments are both the provider of data on which the 
repayments are based and the obligor), illiquidity (given the often smaller issue size), and 
difficulty in pricing (due to shorter time series) hinder market development.  Finally, 
                                                 
6 The country risk assessments being done by commercial banks have shifted away from traditional country 
risks and now consider more collective debtor risk, such as the collapse of a large part of the banking 




many risks – such as volatile capital flows, contagion, and sudden stops – are hard to 






3. DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNMENT DEMAND FOR RISK 
MANAGEMENT  
 
Given the large exposures, the large costs, and the limited use of risk management, the 
scope for improvements would seem to be large.  How to improve risk management and 
what to do will depend on three steps: clarifying the objectives of risk management, 
assessing what is feasible, and identifying what the various actors – governments, 
markets and international financial institutions – can and want to do. The first question is 
how much risk management in what forms do governments want? 
 
3.1. Expectations from theory  
 
One way to start the analysis is to compare risk-management incentives in idealized 
contracts of different types by different parties. One can start by reviewing the optimal 
risk management decision for a corporation. The easy (or naïve) approach would be to 
assume that corporations should hedge as much as possible, as the costs of hedging are 
minimal with efficient financial markets, while the benefits are numerous, e.g., reduced 
bankruptcy risks, ability to focus on the firm’s competitive advantages.  Considering then 
hedging as part of the overall liability structure of a firm, an all-equity financed firm 
would be optimal from management’s perspective as it effectively means laying off all 
risks to the financial markets (in this case, the shareholders).  But this ignores some 
complications, in particular, principal agent issues, and does not reflect real life financial 
structures where we observe much debt financing.   
 
Even in efficient financial markets, some amount of debt is preferred to a full equity 
contract by both corporations and their investors because of moral hazard and 
information asymmetries problems.  After all, when shareholders bear all the risks, but do 
not have full information or control, they give up on the leverage over management 
associated with debt contracts. More generally, taking account of principal-agent 
relationships, theoretical models show that first-best contracts embody only partial risk 
sharing by financial markets and some debt-type financing. Since hedging is a 
combination of debt and equity, it cannot be seen as separate from the corporation’s 
overall choice of instruments available to finance a firm.  Hedging therefore also needs to 
consider trading off various agency issues and full insurance will often not be the best 
contract. 
 
Another dimension to consider from the optimal contracting perspective is the incentive 
of the lenders.  Different contracts provide different incentives for the lenders or 
investors, especially in two dimensions: to monitor (and discipline), and to give advice.  
With a debt contract, lenders will (or at least should) have an incentive to monitor and 
10 
 
discipline the borrower (which they can do by selling their bond holdings, increasing the 
interest rate, or invoking covenants).  Many lenders, especially official and multilateral 
lenders to governments, can also add value through their advice, as can direct investors, 
as in the case of project investments. Incentives for giving advice would be weaker, 
however, under a debt contract, as the payoff on a debt contract is not dependent on 
outcomes (except for the need to avoid bankruptcy).  From the societal perspective of 
both monitoring and advising roles, the optimal contract may not be a debt contract, but 
rather some combination of debt and equity, or not full risk sharing.7  This tradeoff 
between monitoring and advising is the more complicated for official lenders since their 
final objective is not (just) achieving a high rate of return on their claims, but furthering 
development.  As such, official lenders have something more like an “equity” stake in 
countries’ prospects.  To date, however, they have not adjusted their financial contracts 
accordingly. 
 
Risk management by corporations or financial institutions, already complicated, can be 
further different from that by governments.  The aim for sovereigns and their risk 
management will not be that pursued by corporations in developed countries.  Not only 
do governments not have the option to sell equity stakes, they also do have the option to 
default, which corporations cannot in the same way. In other words, the sovereign status 
of countries raises the issue of willingness to pay. Countries need not pay back 
obligations if they do not want, even when they can, whereas corporations can be forced 
to (partially) pay up through a bankruptcy filing.  There will be “voluntary” defaults if the 
(perceived) costs of continuing to pay are higher than the benefits.  These defaults have 
been frequently observed, even in recent years (such as Argentina, Russia), where 
arguably with better policies the governments would have been able to repay.8 
 
The willingness to pay (or default) can be modeled in many ways.  As a gross 
simplification, it can be done assuming either intertemporal or intratemporal economic 
sanctions. The intertemporal sanctions may be the cutoff from all future lending as banks 
refuse to lend forever to the country (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981), and the intratemporal 
sanctions may be the inability to earn foreign exchange from trade today if trading 
partners impose sanctions or otherwise shut the country out from international activities 
(Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a).9  The two “autarky” punishment models can have quite 
different implications.  In the intertemporal case, the country will default when the 
opportunity costs of not being able to borrow ever again are low, one such case 
                                                 
7 There is a similarity here with the venture capital industry.  The venture capitalist (VC) typically is 
involved not just as a financier, but also provides advice on the business plan of the entrepreneur and may 
“guide” his investments. The financial contract between the entrepreneur and the VC involves 
combinations of control and cash flow rights and payoffs schedules that balance the consequent tradeoffs. 
8 There will of course be a social tradeoff here, as to what extent the governments can and want to tax their 
citizens. As such, Argentina, Russia and other cases may not have had the political choices but to default. 
9 See also Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz, 1986; Eaton and Fernandez, 1995 review the literature. 
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presumably being when the terms of trade are good and are expected to remain “good”.10  
In the intratemporal sanction case, the cutoff from trade may be the least costly when the 
terms of trade are poor, and the country may then default.   
 
The implications of these two models for optimal financial contracts and associated risk 
management are quite different.  To avoid default if the intertemporal model obtained, 
the payment schedule has to be less in good states than the associated possible bargaining 
and other costs of default.  The anti-default contract in this case would thus involve very 
little risk sharing (i.e., the anti-default incentive is that defaulters bear the cost of default).  
To avoid default if the intratemporal model obtained, however, payments to creditors (or 
anyone else) would be lower in the bad states than in the good states, thus achieving more 
risk sharing (i.e., although defaulters get punished, creditors do not get paid).  In the 
intertemporal model, the default constraint thus leads to less risk sharing than in the 
intratemporal model .The point of these examples is not so much which one of the two is 
the “correct” model for sovereign debts – neither is – but rather that the incentives that 
might be reflected in contracts as regards risk sharing for governments can be quite 
different from those for corporations.   
 
In the world that actually exists, it seems the government borrowers would be better off 
with loan contracts that balance the various constraints with some form of limited risk 
sharing (see Kletzer and Wright, 2000 for a specific example). Full international risk 
sharing is likely not optimal, since the agents to whom the risk is shifted want the 
government to manage its affairs responsibly.  Rather, the desired amount and type of 
loans-cum-risk management will be those that reduce the likelihood of incurring the 
bargaining and other costs of default, yet at the same time take into account the principal 
agent and information asymmetries problems.   
 
More generally, the benefits from increased risk sharing – whether for corporations or for 
countries – come from avoiding or reducing certain costs.  This will importantly include 
reducing the costs from adjusting the budget to external shocks.  Commodity stabilization 
funds, for example, may derive their greatest value from allowing for easier budgeting, 
rather than from smoothing foreign exchange shocks. Furthermore, one needs to 
differentiate ex-ante and ex-post risks and unexpected from expected price variations.  
For example, there is risk coming from unexpected price changes and from variability in 
expected prices (such as that due to seasonal variation).  The latter is clearly less of 
concern as it can usually be hedged while the former cannot be hedged, although it can be 
smoothed using savings and borrowings. 
                                                 
10 This will depend in part on whether the country can save in foreign exchange and use these savings to 
smooth shocks in the future or whether lenders have access to these savings, i.e., can seize them, in case of 
default.  See Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) 
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3.2. Low priority for risk management in practice   
 
Despite what might be expected from the discussion of theoretical contracts, there is in 
practice little risk management by sovereigns or by the private sectors in developing 
countries.  Indeed, while many private agents in developed countries hedge, most 
sovereigns in developed countries do not make much use of hedging opportunities, even 
where active and liquid markets exist and where there is no concern for credit risk. There 
is a lack of use of risk management instruments by governments and their entities within 
countries (state-owned enterprises, provinces, etc.) that otherwise have good credit 
standings.  Countries like Norway or US states like Alaska, Louisiana and Texas that are 
heavily exposed to oil prices, for example, have high credit-ratings and are thus not 
constrained in issuing any type of financial instrument; yet they do not issue oil-indexed 
bonds or do much hedging.11  They also make limited use of exchange-traded futures and 
options, which exist for most major prices.  Although the price indexes may not match 
perfectly, some risk reduction can still be achieved, yet few sovereigns seem to 
participate (this observation comes with some caveats since publicly available data do not 
provide the identity of participants in hedging markets and true participation can thus be 
higher).  
 
These “facts” suggest problems other than limited access to the relevant financial market 
instruments play an important role in the unwillingness of sovereigns and public agencies 
to hedge. Perhaps part of the reason is belief in having access to credit in the event of 
need, whether the debtor is a developed or developing country sovereign. The experience 
of many developing country governments has included the provision of (cheap) 
international financial assistance that has smoothed shocks.  This may especially be true 
for low-income countries, where many donors have special assistance programs for 
dealing with various types of shocks.   
 
But the extent of actual counter-cyclical financing is often exaggerated. Ex-post 
smoothing has mostly been insufficient and inefficient.  Even tools specifically designed 
to deal with commodity prices or terms of trade variations and other external shocks (e.g., 
STABEX, now replaced by FLEX, of the European Commission, the IMF’s 
Compensatory (and Contingency) Financing Facility, Buffer Stock Financing Facility, 
and other adjustment programs, the World Bank’s adjustment lending) are based on ex-
post financing.  These schemes end up being cumbersome – hard to access as countries 
need to comply with (additional) reforms and often too late as lags for disbursements are 
long – and are actually used relatively little.  Assistance provided in the context of natural 
                                                 
11 Louisiana and Texas used to have commodity-hedging programs, and still have it on their books, but 
currently do not undertake active price hedging.  Alaska has a commodity stabilization fund, but that was 
not functioning well (see Condon, 2002, who also reviews Louisiana and Texas’ experiences). Norway has 
a “commodity stabilization fund” as it invests a substantial portion of its oil revenues in foreign exchange.   
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disasters (e.g., the World Bank’s Emergency Recovery Loans) has also too often been ad-
hoc and not always timely.  
 
While the intention is counter-cyclical, in light of lags in disbursement, actual aid flows 
from bilateral donors are, beside very volatile, pro-cyclical (e.g., there is a positive 
correlation between aid and GDP or fiscal revenues; see further Bulíř and Hamman, 
2003).   If one were to strip out IMF packages to countries in severe distress, multilateral 
lending itself is likely to be pro-cyclical as well. And, apart from being inefficient, the 
relatively cheap and easy official assistance following external shocks has created moral 
hazard on the part of borrowers and private lenders in reducing incentives for real and 
financial risk management. 
 
Another hypothesis for explaining developing country sovereigns’ under-use of risk 
management is that they actually believe the cost of default is bearable. However, the 
truth is that defaults are inefficient and costly as well.  This is true for defaults on both 
private and official debts, although in the case of the low-income countries largely 
indebted to official lenders, the costs of default are not as obvious, as net transfers to 
these countries remain high in spite of being de-facto in default. Nevertheless, there are 
costs, not least in the form of protracted negotiations with lenders. The uncertainty 
surrounding debt crises also imposes costs,12 as the impact of shocks is asymmetric. This 
come in terms of reduced investment, higher cost of capital, adjustment programs going 
off track easier, more pro-cyclical public spending, etc., all leading to lower economic 
growth.  The impact may be even more so for the lower income segment of the 
populations.  Agénor (2004) reviews the evidence and shows that the impact of growth 
on poverty appears to be asymmetric, resulting from episodes of negative growth rates 
increasing poverty permanently.   
 
Indeed, there has been an increasing attention to risk management in many countries in 
recent years in the form of self-insurance. The self-insurance is most notable in the form 
of (very) large foreign exchange reserves, especially today in East Asian countries, which 
by themselves are surely inefficient for countries in early stages of their development.   
 
                                                 
12 However, from analytical models, it is not clear that higher uncertainty always means lower welfare. 
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4. HOW TO IMPROVE SOVEREIGN RISK MANAGEMENT  
 
While full risk sharing (shifting) is not the likely solution to strengthening sovereign risk 
management, the constraints identified – in terms of tools available and the countries’ 
own constraints – may still prevent even the more targeted and limited forms of risk 
management.  What are still possible ways forward to improve risk management and 
what approaches are feasible?  Here is it useful to distinguish between steps that can be 
undertaken respectively by governments, financial markets and international financial 
institutions. 
 
4.1. Governments   
Steps to be taken here concern the degree of risk-taking by the parties within the country, 
the risk management approaches taken by the government and the possible barriers to 
risk management for the private and public sectors in the country. 
 
First, countries should consider the allocation of risks between the public and private 
sectors domestically. They may find that the public sector takes on too much risk or, in 
some cases, too little.  The government may be able to shed some risks to the private 
sector or otherwise change the risk allocation, such that it is faced with those risks that it 
is best suited to bear. How to achieve this shedding or altering of risks will vary from 
country to country.  It may imply continued reform in various dimensions, including 
liberalization, privatization, altering the nature of public social security obligations to 
shift more risks to individuals, or assuring a proper institutional environment in the 
banking system that limits moral hazard.  Examples in the real sector of how to alter risk 
allocation include extending the risk sharing that is already often used in natural resource 
exploration to other sectors with price or quantity risks. 
 
These reforms can over time encourage more international risk sharing by the private 
sector itself. Furthermore, the development of local financial markets, such as bond 
markets, foreign exchange hedging and other derivatives markets, can reduce the extent 
of foreign currency borrowing by corporations and financial institutions and associated 
risks, and invite more foreign investors to share risks.  And, of course, the government 
can encourage real diversification, even though that itself may be impeded by the 
volatility the country currently faces. These actions will take time, however, and will not 
always be available on an efficient scale, especially not for the smaller developing 
countries.  Arguably, there can be a trap of volatility, making institutional changes and 
investments in developing new financial markets more difficult. 
 
Second, better, more strategic approaches to sovereign debt and risk management can 
have high payoffs.  A more strategic approach is often needed for several reasons (see 
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Claessens and Kreuser, 2004). There are complex links between the various external risks 
to consider, but often these are not being considered.  An obvious example is that cross-
currency exchange risks (say between the dollar and euro) on external debt may be offset 
by those incurred on a country’s foreign exchange reserves.  Coordination between the 
central bank and the ministry of finance can then lead to easy risk reduction gains, 
without the need for involvement of external financial markets.  Another example is that 
the prices of export and imports, and indirectly fiscal revenues, maybe correlated in some 
way with major interest rates and currencies.  Commodity prices expressed in dollars, for 
example, have been found to have an inverse relationship with the dollar exchange rate.  
This potentially creates a natural hedge against some external risks for commodity 
exporters that also borrow in non-dollar currencies, or actually adds to risks, in case of a 
commodity importer borrowing in non-dollars. And, as noted, the nature of sovereign 
liability, with implicit option to default and renegotiate, requires a comprehensive 
assessment of what risks are optimal to insure against.  It is possible, for example, that it 
is more effective to try to insulate against relatively modest shocks, but to allow for 
renegotiations through partial defaults in case of large shocks.  Or, alternatively, the costs 
of default may be so large that extreme events are best to insure against.  These issues 
need to be evaluated before embarking on a risk management program.  
 
There are also many interrelations between private sector and public sector risk 
management actions.  The private sector may (not) be undertaking risk management in 
response to public sector actions, creating coordination issues.  Risks for the government 
clearly also depend on private sector’s actions, such as the risk of financial crisis. Again, 
many of these risks are endogenous as agents act according to the institutional 
environment and react to government policies.  The extensiveness of the safety net for 
financial institutions, for example, will affect the degree of their risk-taking. Or the form 
of exchange rate management can influence private sector risk-taking behavior, as 
through more short-term foreign exchange borrowings with a fixed or pegged exchange 
rate.  This in turns requires a strategic review of risk management, including issues such 
as macroeconomic management and the quality of banking regulation and supervision, 
corporate governance, and the like. 
 
In practice, public sector risk management gets further complicated.  A number of 
questions arise.  Due to the various public institutions involved (central bank, ministries, 
state-owned enterprises), coordination issues arise. Should one pursue a decentralized 
approach, for example, where say state-owned enterprises hedge on their own, with 
perhaps some price or quantity adjustments to assure an optimal solution, or a more 
centralized approach, where all hedging is done in one place? Or can a central entity 
provide hedging services to other entities on an adjusted price basis?  How to coordinate 
in practice the risk management between the many agencies (central bank, ministries, 
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state-owned enterprises) is difficult in any setting, but even more so in the institutionally 
weak environments found in many developing countries.  Issues of control, oversight and 
accountability also arise, particularly with the more sophisticated risk management 
techniques. Many a time a risk management program has ended up in large losses, even 
in relatively sophisticated settings (e.g., Orange County in the US, Codelco in Chile).   
 
Private sector risk management is not easy either; lack of creditworthiness and know-how 
hinder many private entities.  Scale is a problem, particularly for many cash crops 
produced on a small-scale (coffee, cocoa).  Indeed, small-scale farmers are not potential 
clients for standard market-based insurance schemes.  Commodity boards, the obvious 
developing country counterparty for international hedging instruments, have been largely 
closed down by structural adjustment policies. While this may have been for other, good 
reasons, it does leave in many cases a vacuum.  Export companies can in principle take 
on the function of intermediaries of risk management products, but the experience to date 
suggests that they do not naturally do this.  In most market economies, it often is the 
provider of financing that has instigated the use of risk management, not the trade 
intermediary.  Small firms, though, are less likely to rely on external financing.  As a 
consequence, farmers still get to absorb the risk of short-term price volatility, even 
though instruments are available. 
 
Many of these concerns are not unique to risk management and also apply to debt, fiscal 
and public expenditure management more generally.  The conditions usually associated 
with good debt and fiscal management include credible policy-making, solid institutions 
and good and independent statistics.  Good risk management will require in addition in 
many cases strong back offices (that process transactions and conduct accounting and 
control services) and middle offices (that provide data analysis and markets monitoring).  
What constitutes the minimum institutional setup for effective risk management is hard to 
say, but surely the simpler the risk management, the lower the requirements.  Very 
sophisticated derivatives hedging programs requiring constant market presence are 
unlikely to be sustainable in all but a few middle-income countries.  Simple hedges put 
on at some standard points in time are likely the best for many countries.  Even better 
may be tools that combine financing with risk management. Yet, the simplest of these 
tools, say GDP-indexed bonds, are not available easily, pointing to the need for the 
supply of tools in financial markets to improve.   
 
4.2. Markets  
 
Markets can help improve risk management. First, financial markets can nudge countries 
to adopt better risk management. Although there are many coordination issues, there is 
some scope to increase incentives. Collective action clauses, for example, which recently 
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have been more universally adopted in bonds, tie closer together the incentives of 
bondholders and may facilitate better risk management.  There may be opportunities to 
reduce barriers in creditor countries, e.g., to adapt the regulations for pension funds and 
other institutional investors so as to allow and encourage investments in price- or 
currency indexed (real) bonds.  There may also be scope in improving accounting rules 
such that real, rather than nominal risks are being measured.  Clearer analysis of the risks 
facing developing countries, possibly provided by international financial agencies and 
institutions, may help coordinate market actions as well. 
 
Second, there maybe some scope to encourage financial innovations that can facilitate 
better risk management, and to introduce new, particularly simple instruments.  There 
have been some new financial instruments, such as natural catastrophe and weather 
related bonds, which are particularly suited to developing countries (see Gurenko, 2004).  
A few countries and states, including California and Japan, have issued earthquake 
bonds. Rainfall and temperature indexed instruments have been used on a small scale, but 
can be further expanded, particularly through diversification across borders.  There have 
been more exotic suggestions, such as the Shiller macro-type hedges (Shiller, 1993, 
2003), the Merton country pension swaps (Bodie and Merton, 2002) and other indexed-
type instruments, which have not taken off, even in or among developed countries.  
Proposals have been recently revived, however, among others by the IMF (IMF, 2004, 
Borensztein and Mauro, 2004) and the US Treasury, especially on GDP-indexed bonds 
(Council of Economic Advisors, 2004), so there may be progress in the near future.   
 
There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these instruments, including concerns 
on moral hazard, measurement issues, standardization, and liquidity of instruments. 
Financial innovations furthermore are costly and may take time to reach sufficient scale.  
The very fact that the nature of financial innovations is haphazard and that creating actual 
viable markets is difficult makes it hard to predict whether any of these ideas will take off 
on a scale significant enough to improve risk management for developing countries.  It is 
still difficult, for example, if not impossible to obtain in any developed country a price-
indexed mortgage, while the economic case is strong.  Yet, and especially for the 
simplest of these instruments, there is much more that can be done by international 
financial agencies. 
 
4.3. Official lenders and other international financial institutions   
 
International agencies have a large stake in improved risk management by developing 
countries for a number of reasons.  For one, they ought to be concerned about protecting 
their own claims on countries exposed to external risks.  In principle, as other lenders do, 
they have an incentive to encourage countries to hedge.   The fact that they have been 
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lenders with senior status, however, has reduced their incentives to call for better risk 
management by countries.  Second, and related incentive to require better risk 
management, is that many a times adjustment programs have gone off track because of 
external shocks. The fact, for example, that many of the countries breached their debt 
limits quickly after receiving debt relief or new external financing has been attributed in 
part to the adverse shocks these countries have suffered after programs were put in 
place.13  Since international agencies have a large (reputational) stake in the success of 
adjustment programs and maintaining overall macro-economic stability, improved risk 
management is further in their interests. Third, international financial institutions are very 
important in influencing countries’ overall policy environment, both in term of country 
specific programs as well as in terms of the overall direction of the official and donor 
community.   
 
For these reasons, international financial institutions have several incentives to improve 
overall risk management by their clients.  They also have several opportunities to do so. 
One, their own lending and risk management tools can be improved. The existing ex-
ante, and ex-post contingent lending mechanisms from international financial institutions 
are in principle attractive (as they are designed for such shocks and have low costs), but 
have proven difficult to use in practice (e.g., see the former Contingent Credit Line 
(CCL) of the IMF).  The qualification criteria have been hard to design in such a way to 
make the mechanisms useful to countries most exposed.  And, as with private credit lines, 
applying to these instruments (the CCL especially) would allegedly have been perceived 
negatively by markets, and thus by countries.  Rather, it may be more efficient if standard 
loans from international financial institutions had contingencies directly built into them.  
For many shocks, this may be difficult, but for some clearly exogenous exposures this 
can be done, e.g., using loans indexed to commodity prices.  Especially, when risks can 
be easily diversified internally within lending institutions, such as those arising from 
energy price changes where both importers and exporters are major borrowers, 
instruments can be usefully provided at very low costs.  Furthermore, the risk of adverse 
selection is small given official lenders’ detailed knowledge of these economies.   
 
To date, these proposals have not gone very far for a variety of reasons.  One of which 
may be that it is more efficient to separate the hedge from the lending instruments, as we 
observe in most financial markets.  Another reason arises from a culture in international 
financial institutions against financial innovations out of fear of taking on new risks 
themselves, which argues for the status quo and against developing risk-mitigating loan 
instruments of their own.  But these ideas of indexed loans are still worth exploring. This 
can be done in the context of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for low-income 
                                                 




countries channeled through or in other forms supported by international financial 
institutions, especially the concessional window of the World Bank, the International 
Development Association (IDA).  For IDA, indexed instruments could be very beneficial 
for borrowers and the costs to lenders would be minimal.  The risk premiums to be 
charged for providing insurance could be very low as these countries’ economic 
prospects bear little correlation with developed countries’ economies; see further 
Hausmann (2004) for a proposal to denominate IDA lending in local currency units 
indexed to local inflation.  
 
Improved risk sharing could benefit the lenders as well.  Indexing the repayment to the 
country’s prospects may enhance the international financial institutions’ incentives to 
monitor the country and provide it the right type of financing, advice and other support.  
And, when applied to a large class of official creditors, indexing can avoid the costly 
renegotiations among creditors in case of non-repayment due to shocks, as has been the 
case to date for debt problems of the low-income countries that are being renegotiated 
almost continuously in the Paris Club. 
 
The international financial institutions can also offer financial instruments for risk 
management to countries where the creditworthiness constraint prevents access to 
international financial markets, and even when they have no lending relationship.  The 
World Bank already offers countries swaps and other derivatives, including instruments 
indexed to commodity prices, but so far it has been a rather disappointing effort to 
intervene in this area.  Although offering these tools reduces the creditworthiness 
constraint, very few borrowers have used the options of World Bank intermediated risk 
management on interest and foreign exchange risks, and none on commodity risks.  
While this may be partly for reasons internal to the World Bank,14 becoming a larger 
intermediary of risk management tools on demand from countries may still not be 
realistic without some other changes, including those discussed above. Nevertheless, 
thought is being given in international financial institutions to develop more efficient 
“insurance”-type contracts, including those that leverage off private sector instruments.   
 
Furthermore, official lenders could reduce the impact of shocks by hedging their own 
portfolios, thereby reducing the ex-post impact of shocks on their future lending and 
other decisions.  The argument is that due to the extent that exogenous shocks adversely 
affect the quality of loans, it hinders the development contribution of official lenders, and 
                                                 
14 The use of swaps still counts against the credit ceiling the World Bank uses and has to compete within 
the overall lending against other lending products. It is not obvious whether the lack of demand represent 
some distortion as to the way in which derivatives are counted against lending programs, the way in which 
the dialogues are being conducted on the lending programs (i.e., lending programs may come with more 
advice and thus be more valuable to the country and/or to the provider) or some other constraint not related 
to country demand.  
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thus hedging can offer benefits. Arguably, for example, the shocks that led to the over-
indebtedness of many low-income countries resulted in perverse behavior of official 
lenders – as they continued to lend owing to concern about recovering outstanding loans, 
which improved risk management could have avoided.   
 
This is not unique to official lenders, of course, and is much observed in private markets.  
In the 1980s, for example, the large exposures of many commercial banks to developing 
countries triggered in part by the rise in interest rates and drop in commodity prices 
hindered their ability to restructure their exposures in the most efficient manner.  
Specifically, the US commercial banks that had in the mid-1980s large exposures to over-
indebted developing countries relative to their own capital engaged more in rescheduling 
than in the more efficient, and ex-post clearly necessary, write-offs.  Interesting, the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC, part of the World Bank group) already engages 
in hedging its equity investments against some exogenous shocks so as to mitigate the 
impact on its own balance sheet.  Some lessons could be derived from this experience. 
 
Yet an additional option is that, as with private lenders, borrowers from international 
agencies may need to be required to include hedges or otherwise show that they have 
adequate risk management in place.  To some extent this is already occurring as the 
general surveillance of the IMF and specific risk assessments, such as those of the 
financial system under the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), identify large 
vulnerabilities and risk management deficiencies.  But these assessments are not yet tied 
to the lending decision of these and other international financial institutions.  Again, there 
are tradeoffs, since the requirement of, say, satisfying a low risk assessment by the IMF 
or any other seal of “proper risk management” before any lending could take place would 
create some double conditionality.  Furthermore, it could hamper the development 
objectives of the international financial institutions as many developing countries have 
limited choices (to hedge and to attain proper institutions) and have to accept some 
degree of risks.   
 
Finally, international financial institutions could become more active in several ways 
other than directly related to their own lending and adjustment programs.  They could, for 
example, set standards for new risk management tools.  For example, they can define the 
most useful risk management product for certain type of borrowers, e.g., puts for some 
type of countries, or swaps for others.  They can introduce objective indexes to be used 
for (new) risk management tools, e.g., an index for certain, not so standard commodity 
prices.  They can help overcome the coordination and liquidity issues in financial markets 
by the large issuance of indexed instruments especially useful for developing countries.  
In the first instance, the international financial institutions need not intermediate these 
instruments, but rather they could just issue indexed instruments and then lay off these 
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risks back in the international capital markets.  The World Bank has done some of this, 
by issuing various linked instruments (gold price, exchange-rate linked), which were then 
hedged by international banks with the after-hedged costs passed on to the Bank.  These 
were pure arbitrage-based borrowings, however.  Instead, there could be more strategic 
issuance so as to jump-start a market.  For example, the World Bank could issue a 
commodity-linked bond or a general emerging markets’ GDP-indexed bond.  There may 
also be scope to introduce markets for securities that are in zero net supply.  For example, 
one can conceive of an index that has good hedging benefits for developing countries but 
has low correlation with developed countries’ financial markets.  A market could be 
made by third-parties in this security, where the official agencies could take various roles, 
e.g., develop the methodology, set the daily value of the index, provide clearing and 






Better sovereign risk management for countries is much needed, but will remain difficult 
to attain.  Current practices can be enhanced though and new tools can be introduced at 
low costs.  The starting point has to be the incentive framework for risk management on 
both the borrower and lenders’ sides.   For borrowers, much scope lies in the 
improvement of countries’ institutional infrastructure, such that more risks are delegated 
away from the public sector towards the private sector.  For international markets, while 
some innovations are possible in terms of altering incentives and adding new products, 
the larger barrier is the coordination problem inherent in financial markets.  
 
The most promising start in terms of changes in financial contracting might be to 
redesign the contracts at which official lending takes place for low-income countries.  A 
specifically useful suggestion is to introduce more indexing to the country’s economic 
outcomes, e.g., GDP-indexed loans.  The benefits can be three-fold: the country benefits 
from more risk-sharing, while the costs to the lenders are minimal; there is a greater 
alignment of the interests as lenders directly share in the prospects of the country; and 
there is reduced scope for conflicts among creditors in case of defaults, thereby reducing 
the ex-post negotiations costs. Cost aspects involve managing the risk of moral hazard 
and the difficulty of measuring GDP objectively.  Making the instruments as simple as 
possible and some oversight over national statistics collection and production will be 
necessary.  
 
In addition, international agencies can help introduce better risk management tools in a 
number of ways, among others by: providing objective price indexes on risks of interest 
to developing countries, e.g., commodity prices indexes, rainfall and other climatic 
indexes, etc.; developing markets in “zero-supply type” securities, such as a “low 
correlation” security, which third-parties could trade in.  The international agencies can 
provide the index, trading systems and/or settlement and clearing systems, and help start 
the market; issuing indexed liabilities and thereby jump-starting and creating markets in 
tools of specific interest to developing countries; and intermediating more risk 
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